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Abstract
This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between money
market uncertainty and unexpected deviations in retail interest rates
in a sample of 10 OECD countries. We ﬁnd that, with the exception
of the US, money market uncertainty has only a modest impact on
the conditional volatility of retail interest rates. Even for the US we
ﬁnd that the eﬀects of money market uncertainty are spread out over
time. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that banking rela-
tionships include implicit insurance arrangements and thereby reduce
uncertainty.
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11 Introduction
Retail interest rates are an important determinant of the saving and invest-
ment decisions of households and ﬁrms in most economies. Bank lending
rates are a key indicator of the marginal cost of short-term external funding
for ﬁrms (Borio and Fritz, 1995). In addition the interest rate pass-through
process is a pivotal element of the monetary transmission mechanism, since it
determines how strongly policy-induced variations in money market rates are
transmitted to lending and deposit rates and ultimately to saving and invest-
ment. Hence, retail interest rates play an important role for macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations and also for the transmission of monetary policy.
Retail interest rates and the pricing behavior of banks have been the
focus of several studies (see e.g. Sander and Kleimeier, 2006, 2004; De Bondt
and Mojon, 2005; De Bondt, 2005; Mojon, 2000; Cottarelli and Kourelis,
1994). This research concentrates on the ﬁrst moment properties of the
interest rate pass-through process. A typical ﬁnding is that retail interest
rates adjust sluggishly to changes in market interest rates. Here we go one
step further and investigate the second moment relationship between market
and retail interest rates. More precisely, we address the question to what
extent uncertainty concerning money market interest rates impacts upon
unexpected retail rate ﬂuctuations.
2The relationship banking literature (see e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000) pro-
vides a theoretical basis for a second moment link between market and re-
tail interest rates. In addition to solving asymmetric information problems,
long-term relationships can give rise to implicit interest rate insurance. Ba-
sically, banks which have long-term relationships with their customers tend
to oﬀer relatively stable retail interest rates despite the occurrence of shocks
that give rise to volatile market interest rates. Sticky retail interest rates
may therefore result from an implicit contract between banks and their risk
averse customers. This role of the banking sector as a shock absorber may
have implications for the volatility of business cycles as emphasized by Iss-
ing (2002). Berger and Udell (1992) are among the ﬁrst to interpret the
relatively smooth behavior of retail rates as an indication for risk-sharing
agreements between banks and borrowers (for an alternative explanation of
retail rate stickiness based on adjustment costs see for instance Hofmann
and Mizen, 2004). Hence, if long-term relationships with implicit insurance
against liquidity shocks characterize a banking system, we should observe
smooth expected retail rates that do not immediately adjust to changes in
money market interest rates. Moreover, the correlation between measures
of money market uncertainty and unexpected changes in retail rates should
be low due to the insurance element of the implicit contract. If insurance
against money market uncertainty is complete there should be no relationship
3between unexpected retail rate deviations and money market uncertainty at
all. Thus, our analysis represents a test of the hypothesis that an implicit
insurance against liquidity shocks is a source of limited pass-through.
Our study includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, UK and the US. We ﬁnd that money market un-
certainty does not substantially inﬂuence the conditional volatility of retail
interest rates. Our empirical results suggest that banks partially absorb liq-
uidity shocks. Put diﬀerently, banks not only smooth retail interest rates
and thereby reduce the unconditional volatility faced by their customers,
they also reduce the conditional volatility to a signiﬁcant extent in almost all
countries in our sample. Hence, our ﬁndings are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that bank-customer relationships include explicit or implicit risk-sharing
arrangements.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We describe our
empirical strategy in Section 2, discuss our main ﬁndings in Section 3 and
conclude in Section 4.
2 Methodology
Our strategy for assessing the link between uncertainty in the money market
and retail interest rates consists of three steps: We ﬁrst quantify the extent
to which realized retail rates deviate from their expected value. To this end
4we estimate a regression relationship between market interest rates and re-
tail rates for each country. The absolute values of the regression residuals
measure the size of unexpected retail rate deviations. Next we ﬁt a GARCH
model (Bollerslev, 1986) to short-term money market rates to obtain a mea-
sure for money market uncertainty. Here we assume that the conditional
standard deviation of the short-term money market interest rate is a useful
indicator for the degree of uncertainty in the money market. Finally, we
estimate a relationship between unexpected retail rate deviations and our
measure of money market uncertainty.
Let us look at the individual steps in more detail. In the ﬁrst step
we estimate a standard ‘interest rate pass-through’ equation (Cottarelli and
Kourelis, 1994; De Bondt and Mojon, 2005)













t−i + t, (1)
where Rt denotes the retail interest rate, Rm
t is the short-term money market
rate, Rb
t is the long-term government bond yield and ∆ is the diﬀerence op-
erator. We use ﬁrst diﬀerences because nominal interest rates are frequently
found to be integrated. Following De Bondt and Mojon (2005) we include
the long-term bond yield in addition to the short-term money market rate to
capture term structure considerations. We estimate equation (1) with cur-
rent short and long term interest rates, three lags of them and three lags of
5the retail rate to cover any ﬁrst moment dynamics in retail rates.
If market and retail rates are cointegrated, then (1) may be extended to
an error-correction model by adding an error-correction term. However, the
empirical evidence on cointegration between market rates and retail rates is
mixed. De Bondt (2005) ﬁnds evidence for cointegration between aggregated
euro area retail rates and money market rates, while Kwapil and Scharler
(2006) reject the null hypothesis of cointegration. Sander and Kleimeier
(2006) analyze retail rates from individual euro area countries and ﬁnd some
evidence for asymmetric error-correction for some types of retail rates. Our
data cover about 15 years and are therefore rather short for a meaning-
ful analysis of long-run relationships. Hence, we proceed by estimating (1)
without an error-correction term. However, as a robustness check we reesti-
mate equation (1) augmented with an error-correction term. Our empirical
results turn out to be robust with respect to this modiﬁcation.
We apply a standard GARCH model to the short-term money market
rate to quantify money market uncertainty. More precisely, we estimate a
speciﬁcation of the form
∆R
m
t = δ0 + δ1∆R
m
t−1 + ... + δj∆R
m
t−j + νt (2)
h
2











where money market rate changes ∆Rm
t are modelled as an autoregressive
6process with time varying conditional variance h2
t. We choose the number of
lags j, m and n in (2) and (3) individually for each country on the basis of
statistically signiﬁcant model coeﬃcients and diagnostic checks of the resid-
uals in (2). In particular, we check whether the standardized residuals in (2)
are uncorrelated and homoscedastic. The conditional volatility of short-term
market rates should mirror the liquidity situation for short term funds. How-
ever, we remain agnostic with respect to the ultimate source of changes in
in interest rates. Changes could be due to monetary policy actions or more
generally due to any other type of shock impacting upon the level of liquidity
and bank reserves.
Our main focus is on the relationship between unexpected retail rate
deviations and money market uncertainty as reﬂected by the conditional
standard deviation ht. Hence, we estimate the equation
|ˆ t| = λ0 + λ1ht + λ2 |ˆ t−1| + ζt. (4)
If banks provide insurance against interest rate shocks, then they should
shield their customers from uncertainty associated with market interest rates.
Thus, if implicit risk sharing agreements are a special feature of banking
relationships, we would expect ht to have only a small eﬀect on |ˆ t|. Thus,
λ1 < 1 indicates that banks provide insurance and λ1 = 0 implies that banks
completely eliminate interest rate uncertainty for their customers. Note that
7we proxy retail interest rate uncertainty by the absolute value of ˆ t. Using
ˆ 2
t instead of the absolute deviation leaves our conclusions unchanged.
3 Empirical Results
We use monthly IFS data on deposit and lending retail interest rates, money
market interest rates and long-term government bond yields over the period
1990:1 to 2005:9 to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3). The sample sizes
diﬀer somewhat due to limited data availability for some countries. Table
1 shows the estimates of immediate and ﬁnal pass-through. The coeﬃcient









which we calculate based on the estimated coeﬃcients.
The left bloc in Table 1 shows the results for deposit rates. Immediate
pass-through varies from around zero in the Netherlands and Portugal to
0.75 in Australia and the ﬁnal pass-through ranges from 0.01 in Portugal to
0.90 in the US. The null hypothesis of complete ﬁnal pass-through can be
rejected for all countries except the US at standard signiﬁcance levels. The
null of a zero long-run pass-through cannot be rejected for the Netherlands
and Portugal. The results reported in the right bloc of Table 1 indicate that
the ﬁnal pass-through tends to be higher in the case of lending rates. For
8the US and the Netherlands we cannot reject the null hypothesis of complete
long-run pass-through.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Let us now turn to the second moment linkage of market interest rates
and retail rates. To conserve space we do not report the estimation results
for equations (2) and (3) from which we generate our measure of money
market uncertainty (the results are of course available upon request). It is
worth noting, however, that a standard GARCH(1,1) speciﬁcation captures
the volatility dynamics in the market rate of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the
UK and the US. The even simpler ARCH (1) model is suﬃcient for Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands. Only Portugal and Spain require GARCH(1,2)
and ARCH(3) speciﬁcations respectively, to adequately describe the second
moment dynamics in the money market interest rate.
Table 2 presents the results from the estimation of (4), the equation we are
mainly interested in. As we can see from the left bloc of the table, the point
estimate for λ1 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for Australia, Canada,
Germany, Italy and the US. Hence, money market uncertainty signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the conditional volatility of the bank deposit rate in these countries.
Moreover, for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK we ﬁnd that λ2 is signiﬁcant,
which indicates that deposit rate volatility exhibits some persistence in these
9countries. However, the point estimates for λ2 are typically small. Hence,
most of the impact of money market uncertainty occurs contemporaneously.
The results for lending rate uncertainty in the right bloc of Table 2 show a
signiﬁcant pass-through of money market uncertainty for Australia, Canada,
Italy, Spain and the US. Signiﬁcant persistence in the volatility of the lending
rate is found for Australia, Italy, Spain, UK and the US.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Semenov (2006) reports that arms-length lending is characteristic for Aus-
tralia, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US. Hence,
one would expect to ﬁnd a higher impact on lending rate volatility in these
countries which is consistent with our results. The noteworthy exception is
the UK, where our results indicate that banks provide substantial insurance
against money market ﬂuctuations. We also ﬁnd that λ2 is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for the lending rate in the Netherlands. However, the
point estimate is relatively large in an economic sense, although estimated
rather imprecisely. In fact, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
long run impact of money market uncertainty is complete for the Nether-
lands (H0 : λ1 + λ2=1), which is in line with arms-length lending and also
true for the US. In contrast, we ﬁnd an economically small and statistically
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for Germany, where lending relationships are partic-
10ularly close (Semenov, 2006).
In short, we ﬁnd that in most of the countries in our sample, banks pro-
vide substantial insurance against money market uncertainty. The exception
is the US, where we cannot reject the hypothesis that money market uncer-
tainty is fully reﬂected in unexpected deviations in retail rates in the long
run. In contrast, money market uncertainty is not passed on to the con-
ditional volatility of retail rates in the European countries included in our
sample, except for Italy. Hence, in these countries, the banking sectors fully
insure their customers against money market uncertainty. While the bank-
ing sectors in Australia, Canada and Italy also provide a substantial amount
of insurance, money market uncertainty is not completely eliminated. This
result is in line with the view that banking relationships are more widespread
in Europe.
Overall, our results are in favor of the hypothesis that banks provide a
high degree of insurance against liquidity ﬂuctuations as argued in Allen and
Gale (2000) among others. Thus, we may conclude that banking relationships
include implicit or explicit risk-sharing in most countries in our sample.
4 Summary
In this paper we analyze the relationship between money market uncertainty
and unexpected deviations in retail interest rates. We ﬁnd that for the coun-
11tries in our sample, the inﬂuence of money market uncertainty on the condi-
tional volatility of retail interest rates is rather limited. The only exception
is the US, where money market uncertainty is fully passed through to un-
expected deviations of deposit and lending rates in the long run. However,
even for the US we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of money market uncertainty are
spread out over time.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that banking relationships
indeed provide a substantial amount of insurance against unexpected ﬂuctua-
tions in money market rates. Put diﬀerently, banks absorb or at least smooth
shocks, which would otherwise aﬀect retail interest rates, and thereby impact
upon saving and investment decisions of households and ﬁrms. Thus, in this
sense banking relationships may contribute to ﬁnancial and macroeconomic
stability.
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